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Abstract—The goal of physical layer security (PLS) is to make
use of the properties of the physical layer – including the wireless
communication medium and / or the transceiver hardware – to
enable critical aspects of secure communications. In particular,
PLS can be employed to provide i) node authentication, ii) mes-
sage authentication, and, iii) message confidentiality. Unlike the
corresponding classical cryptographic approaches which are all
based on computational security, PLS’s added strength is that it
is based on information theoretic security, in which no limitation
with respect to the opponent’s computational power is assumed
and is therefore inherently quantum resistant. In this survey, we
review the aforementioned fundamental aspects of PLS, starting
with node authentication, moving to the information theoretic
characterization of message integrity, and finally, discussing
message confidentiality both in the secret key generation from
shared randomness and from the wiretap channel point of view.
The aim of this review is to provide a comprehensive road-
map on important relevant results by the authors and other
contributors and discuss open issues on the applicability of PLS
in sixth generation systems.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, physical unclonable
function, RF fingerprinting, node authentication, message in-
tegrity, secrecy encoder, shared randomness, key generation,
confidentiality.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing deployment of wireless systems poses se-
curity challenges in next generation dynamic and decen-
tralized networks, consisting of low cost and complexity
devices. Over the last two decades alternative / comple-
mentary means to secure data exchange in wireless settings
have been investigated in the framework of physical layer
security (PLS), addressing jointly the issues of reliability and
secrecy. PLS takes advantage of the inherent randomness of
wireless communication channels and / or the unclonability
of hardware fabrication processes, to harvest entropy and
deliver authentication, confidentiality, message integrity and
privacy in demanding scenarios. In this chapter, we revisit all
aforementioned aspects from an information theoretic security
perspective.
PLS relies on information theoretic proofs of (weak or
strong) perfect secrecy, a notion first introduced by Shannon
in 1949 [1]. As such, PLS systems cannot be “broken”
irrespective of the adversarial computational power, i.e., the
proofs do not rely on any assumptions regarding the hard-
ness of particular families of algebraic problems. There are
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Figure 1: The three main operations of PLS.
some fundamental differences between information theoretic
security and classical cryptography based security. In the
following, we illustrate some of the pros and cons for each.
Classical cryptography based security: standard cryptosys-
tems as those in employed in the fifth generation (5G) security
protocols have notable strengths:
• There are no known feasible attacks on symmetric key
cryptosystems such as the advanced encryption system
(AES) or elliptic curve Diffie Hellman (ECDH) asym-
metric key encryption, and hence they are trustworthy in
any conceivable scenario as they are thought of achieving
semantic security;
• Only a few assumptions are made about the messages
to be encrypted or the trusted third parties in authen-
tication protocols (e.g., regarding the trustworthiness of
certificate authorities);
• These systems have been widely employed and tested
over decades, the technology is mature, ready-to-use and
nowadays inexpensive.
However, crypto based security has indeed certain disad-
vantages, some of which are pointed out below:
• Generally the semantic security proofs of traditional
crypto systems are built around unproven assumptions
about the hardness of certain “one-way” functions. As a
result, some of these schemes, notably in the realm of
asymmetric key encryption, are considered vulnerable to
quantum attacks;
• Standard crypto is typically employed in upper layers
of the OSI protocol stack, assuming that the PHY
connection has already been established. As a result,
they are inherently “inflexible” with respect to wireless
connectivity issues and will fail in attacks at the physical
layer, e.g., jamming attacks on the control plane;
• State-of-the art key distribution schemes for wireless net-
works based on the classic cryptography model require
a trusted third party and are typically computationally
intensive. Therefore, their application in machine-to-
machine or low latency applications can be challenging
[reference urllc 3 gpp security];
• These security approaches are not tailored to the wire-
less communication properties and are typically not
lightweight. With respect to the latter aspect, as an
example, the level of sophistication of Google’s take on
a lightweight implementation of AES is rather a proof
of the difficulty in rendering these schemes lightweight,
rather than the opposite.
Information theoretic security: Notable advantages of PLS
based security are as follows:
• No computational limitations are placed on the opponent,
PLS schemes that are properly implemented are quantum
secure;
• The achievable secrecy rate is a function of the channel
quality and the block length of the secrecy encoders
and as a result the security is naturally tied to the
communication properties;
• Unlike “distributing” keys, PLS can be used to generate
on-the-fly secret keys, exploiting channel estimation op-
erations that are customarily performed to establish the
PHY connection.
• PLS implementations can be lightweight and related
schemes can be advantageous in Internet of things (IoT)
or low latency constrained scenarios.
Also the disadvantages of this class of security are as
follows
• Some PLS schemes are based on stringent assumptions
about the adversarial channel quality, e.g., the wiretap
channel scenario, that are impractical in the general case;
• PLS technologies have not been tested “in the field”
and it is therefore expected that there will be erroneous
implementations before reaching a satisfactory level of
maturity;
• The performance bounds of the related encoders have not
been characterized in the finite blocklength regime, so the
achievable rates back-off from the information theoretic
infinite blocklenth capacity is yet unknown.
Despite these issues, PLS is currently studied as a possible
second layer of security for particular use cases, e.g., when
implementation issues in the 5G security protocols have
identifiable shortcomings such as vulnerabilities to false base
station attacks [2]. Notably, it is explicitly mentioned as a sixth
generation (6G) enabling technology in the first white paper
on 6G: “The strongest security protection may be achieved
at the physical layer”. In this work, we review how it is
possible to move some of the security core functions down to
the physical layer, exploiting both the communication radio
channel and the hardware as unique entropy sources.
We consider three important security operations: node au-
thentication, message integrity and message confidentiality as
depicted in Fig. 1. In node authentication, the goal is for nodes
to identify uniquely the other side of the communication. With
respect to message integrity, the goal is to be able to identify
tampering attacks on the exchanged messaged, i.e., verify
the integrity of the received information in the presence of
active attackers. Finally, in message confidentiality, users want
to “hide” the content of their transmissions from a passive
opponent (eavesdropper).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II three different PLS methods of node authentication are
reviewed: i) physical unclonable functions (PUFs), ii) biomet-
ric based authentication, and iii) RF fingerprinting. Next, in
Section III, the information theoretic bounds on the achievable
rates when message integrity is required are reviewed, both
for noiseless and noisy transmission channels. Furthermore,
in Section IV we consider message confidentiality. Two al-
ternative approaches to achieve message confidentiality are
reviewed: i) keyless secrecy encoding in wiretap channels
and, ii) channel based secret key generation (SKG), used in
conjunction with symmetric encryption in hybrid schemes.
II. NODE AUTHENTICATION
In all communication networks, users utilize authentication
protocols to prove their identity. In standard crypto protocols,
asymmetric key encryption is typically used in the authentica-
tion phase. However, the standard cryptographic schemes in
the realm of public key encryption (PKE), are computationally
intensive, incurring considerable overhead and can rapidly
drain the battery of energy constrained devices [3], [4].
Additionally, traditional public key generation schemes are not
quantum secure – in that when sufficiently capable quantum
computers will be available they will be able to break current
known public key encryption schemes – unless the key sizes
increase to impractical lengths.
As a result, in 6G, PLS based authentication arises as
a possible alternative. PLS authentication protocols usually
consist of two stages, namely an enrollment stage and a re-
lease (authentication) stage. The enrollment stage occurs off-
line. In this stage, unique characteristics of the node or user
to be authenticated are measured. Hashed versions of these
measurements along with related helper (side) information
are stored at the verifier side in a database. In the release
stage, new measurements are taken and sent to the verifier;
the latter uses the helper information to regenerate the hash
of the initial measurement, in which case the authentication
is successful. The role of the helper information is critical
as it allows to correct for discrepancies between different
measurements due to noise (in any actual system, deriving
the same exact outcome from two consecutive measurements
is impossible). Error correcting codes from the family of
Slepian Wolf encoders are typically used in these systems;
as an example, if the implementation is based on linear block
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Figure 2: Arbiter PUF
codes, the helper information is typically in the form of the
syndrome of the initial measurement.
From an information theoretic point of view, the basic
idea is to generate a hashed version of the initial measure-
ment, similarly to regenerating a unique secret key used for
authentication, derived during the enrollment stage. As the
rate of the secret key generation increases, the attacker has a
harder task to guess it correctly. In other words, the level of
security increases, while a lower bound on the length of the
authentication key is imposed by the size of the brute force
attack that can be mounted by an adversary. In following, we
describe three different PLS approaches employed for node
authentication. We note that a combination of these can also
be employed, in order to increase the authentication vector
size.
A. Physical unclonable functions (PUFs)
The concept a physical unclonable function was first in-
troduced in [5]. The idea is that integrated circuits (ICs)
have uniquenesses in their physical microstructure which is
inherited from inevitable variations during the fabrication
process. These unique characteristics are unpredictable before
the end of the manufacturing and can be considered as digital
signatures or identities of the ICs. A PUF should be unclon-
able, which means that given the exact fabrication procedure,
it is infeasible to reproduce the same physical microstructure.
The security of PUFs stems from these properties. An example
of an arbiter based PUF is depicted in Fig. 2.
PUFs operate based on challenge-response pairs (CRPs). In
the enrollment stage, a set of challenges are applied to a PUF
(e.g., in the form of input voltages to a chain of logical gates)
and the response of the PUF to each challenge, i.e., a hash of
the PUF measurement, are stored in a database at the verifier.
The responses for different challenges are different and each
PUF has a unique response. Due to noise in measurements,
in this stage some helper data is also stored in the database to
enable the re-generation of the registered CRPs in the release
stage. The collected sets of CRPs are considered as the IDs
of the devices to be authenticated.
In the release stage, the verifier presents a particular
challenge to the PUF. After running the challenge, the PUF
releases the corresponding response (PUF measurement). If
the response collected from the PUF in the release stage
along with the helper information can reproduce the stored
authentication key in the enrollment stage, the user is au-
thenticated. A PUF that has an exponential number of CRPs
is considered “strong” [6], i.e., it has a higher entropy and
is a better option for security purposes as opposed to weak
PUFs with polynomial numbers of CRPs. In [7], the authors
consider an information theoretic perspective on PUFs and
derive the entropy in a particular type of PUFs based on their
physical properties.
In the CRP scheme, the attacker may acquire a software
model of the PUF by using information extracted from
exchanged CRPs in the clear. Intrinsically, a PUF hides a
random function, and learning such functions from input-
output pairs falls within the context of machine learning
(ML). The authors in [8] show their proposed PUF is secure
against the strongest known classical and reliability-based
ML attack. Different PUF-based authentication protocols for
wireless sensor networks have recently been proposed in the
literature [9]–[14].
B. Biometrics
Biometric authentication is used for user (as opposed to
device) authentication. The security of the method comes from
the uniqueness and consistency of biometric characteristics
of each person. Similar to PUF based authentication, the
fundamental scheme consists of two stages. In the enrollment
stage the biometric characteristics of users are sampled and
in plain form or through a transformation are stored in
the database of the verifier. Due to noisy measurement and
possible changes in biometric characteristics over time or
damages, helper data is also stored in this stage. In the release
stage, the verifier demands a new biometric sample from the
user and if the new measurement with the assist of the helper
information can reproduce the same data stored during the
enrollment stage, the user is authenticated.
This method of authentication has been widely used over
decades for different applications. However, privacy concerns
pose a major challenge. The biometric characteristics of a
human cannot be changed. If the stored data are compromised
by attackers, they can be used to imitate legitimate users.
Different approaches have been proposed to protect the stored
data from such attacks. For example, in [15], [16] a type of
cryptographic primitive called secure sketch is considered. In
this approach, a hash of the biometric information is stored
in the database along with the helper data. In [17], [18],
the authors study a cancelable biometric scheme in which
an irreversible transformation of the biometric data is stored.
Information theoretic analyses of these schemes have been
performed [19], [20] and the largest rate of the authentication
key has been characterized [21] in absence of privacy require-
ments. In all of the aforementioned works and in the basic
proposed scheme, the helper data can contain information
about the biometric characteristics. The two part paper [22],
[23] studies the privacy-security trade off in biometric security
and considers two scenarios with perfect key protection and
perfect privacy model, that address two different perspectives
of the problem.
a) Perfect key protection system: In this model the helper
data (V ) does not contain any information about the secret key
(K). The privacy of the biometric measurement is measured as
the normalized equivocation rate H(Xn|V )/H(Xn), where
H(·) denotes entropy. The greater normalized equivocation
means the higher level of privacy which can be arbitrarily
close to unity when the mutual information of V and X goes
to zero (I(V ;X) → 0). In perfect key protection system,
there is a trade off between the rate of secret key generation
R and the level of the biometric measurement privacy ∆P .
For a perfect key protection biometric authentication system,
a privacy-security pair (∆P , R) is said to be achievable if for
any ǫ > 0, there exists an integer n, that satisfies the following
conditions:
H(K)/n ≥ R, (1)
H(Xn|V )/H(Xn) ≥ ∆P , (2)
I(V ;K)/n ≤ ǫ, (3)
Pr(K 6= Kˆ) ≤ ǫ, (4)
where X and Kˆ represent the measurement in the enrollment
stage and the estimated secret key, respectively. It has been
shown that the capacity region C contains the set of all
privacy-security pairs (∆P , R) such that [22]
∆P ≤ 1− I(U ;X)− I(U ;Y )
H(X)
, (5)
R ≤ I(U ;Y ), (6)
where Y denotes the measurement in the release stage and U
is an auxiliary random variable such that (U,X, Y ) forms a
Markov chain U → X → Y .
b) Perfect privacy system: In this model the helper data
(V ) does not contain any information about the biomet-
ric measurement (X). The performance of perfect privacy
system can be measured by the rate of secret key genera-
tion and the normalized equivocation of the generated key
H(K|V )/H(K). In this system, a rate-equivocation (R,∆s)
is achievable if for any ǫ > 0, there exists an integer n, that
satisfies the following conditions:
H(K)/n ≥ R, (7)
I(Xn;K)/n ≤ ǫ, (8)
H(K|V )/H(K) ≥ ∆s, (9)
Pr(K 6= Kˆ) ≤ ǫ. (10)
It has been shown that a privacy-rate pair (R,∆s) is achiev-
able if and only if, for the random processes Xn and Y n for
each ǫ > 0 there exist an n and functions Ψn of X
n and Φn
of Y n such that [22]
Pr[Ψn(X
n) 6= Φn(Y n)] ≤ ǫ, (11)
H(Ψn(X
n))/n ≥ R∆s − ǫ. (12)
Note that if K is a function of Xn, perfect privacy means
perfect key protection.
C. Wireless identification using RF fingerprinting
Utilizing wireless channel characteristics is another ap-
proach to authenticate the nodes. In this approach, the wireless
channel characteristics such as the user / device localization,
e.g., using the received signal strength indicator (RSSI) or
the link quality indicator (LQI) and the angle of arrival are
used to verify the “expected location” of the users / devices.
Wireless identification is commonly used in scenarios in
which localization also needs to be verified e.g., in IoT sensors
monitoring temperature and pressure at various equipment.
Different variants of wireless identification have been studied
for different applications [14], [24]–[26].
III. MESSAGE INTEGRITY
A second major requirement of secure communications
is that the legitimate receiver should be able to ensure the
integrity of received messages. In many applications, this
operation is considered even more important than that of
confidentiality, given that many messages might not be “se-
cret” but should be “authentic”. In this scenario, the opponent
is active and can sketch different attacks to deceive the
receiver, typically by tampering with the message in transit.
As an example, in substitution attacks, the attacker changes
content of the message transmitted by the legitimate source.
In impersonation attacks, the attacker sends a fake message
while the source is idle. The receiver should be able to detect
the fake and modified messages from the authentic ones [27],
[28].
Message integrity requires a secret key shared by the two
communicating parties and unknown by the attacker. The
rest of the system design, such as the encoding / decoding
schemes, are publicly available. The receiver considers the
received signal as authenticated / verified (i.e., the integrity
test is successful), if there exists a valid “tag” that can
uniquely relate the received message to the secret key k,
while the attacker cannot produce a valid (tag, message) pair
despite intercepting a large number of related exchanges;
proofs along this line of reasoning fall into the category of
chosen ciphertext semantic security. The entropy of the shared
key should be high enough to not allow the attacker to mount
brute force attacks on the system.
The information theoretic limits of the message authen-
tication problem was first considered by Simmons [29]. In
Simmons’s model, a noiseless channel between the terminals
has been assumed (Fig. 3). In this model, the transmitter
transmits w which is a function of the secret key k and
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Figure 3: The message authentication model for noiseless
channel.
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Figure 4: The message authentication model for noisy chan-
nel.
the message m (w = f(k,m)). The opponent observes
the signal transmitted in the clear. However, the receiver
observes wˆ, which can be different from the original signal
and modified by the opponent. It has been shown that the
success probability of impersonation and substitution attacks
in message authentication can be lower bounded by 2−I(K,W )
and 2−H(K|W ), respectively. Therefore the success probability
of the attacks by the opponent is lower bounded by 1√
|K|
,
where |K| is the size of the key space.
In [30], [31], the authors consider noisy channels and
demonstrate that introducing noise in the model can make the
receiver reject some valid messages. They conclude that chan-
nel noise is detrimental to message authentication. Coversely,
in [32], [33], the authors study the message authentication
problem via noisy channels from a new perspective. The
authors propose a scheme in which the transmitter exploits the
noise in the channel to “hide” the key information from the op-
ponent. In their scheme, the transmitter performs joint channel
coding and message authentication coding. The channel code
is designed such that the conditional probability distribution
after observing the channel output at the opponent side is very
close to a uniform distribution. In [32], a discrete memoryless
channel (DMC) model is considered and it is assumed that the
opponent observes Z with a particular conditional probability
distribution given the message w has been sent (Fig. 4). If the
opponent does not perform any attack, the receiver observes
Y with a particular conditional probability distribution given
w. However, if the opponent performs an attack, it can modify
Y according to its attack policy.
The receiver may make two possible types of error, which
are to wrongly reject an authentic message (false negative))
or to accept a modified or fake message (false positive). The
proposed scheme in [32] utilizes a wiretap channel model
to protect the secret key. Basically, the transmitter chooses
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Figure 5: The wiretap channel.
an input distribution PW such that I(W ;Y )− I(W ;Z) > 0.
Then, the source generates a codebook for the wiretap channel
with 2nI(X;Y ) codewords, where n is the blocklength and we
assume it is large enough to satisfy a low decoding error prob-
ability requirement at the receiver. The source then partitions
the codewords into |K| subsets, i.e., |K| < 2n[I(W,Y )−I(W,Z)].
Each subset is associated with each key.
Assume, the codeword length be large enough that there
be more than |M | codewords in each subset. The source then
divides each subset into |M | bins, each corresponding to a
message. There are multiple codewords in each bin. In the
transmission, if the intended message is m, and the key is
k, the source then randomly chooses a codeword w from
the mth bin of the kth subset using a uniform distribution.
As the coding rate is I(X ;Y ) the receiver can decode the
message with high probability if n is large enough. On the
other hand, according to the fundamental wiretap channel
result, the opponent cannot gather a significant amount of
information about the secret key in this scheme. It is shown
that the success cheating probability is upper bonded by 1|K| ,
which is significantly higher than the bound for the noiseless
channel; as this scheme the transmitter uses the noise of the
channel an an added entropy source to “hide” the key, the
same approach cannot be applied for the noiseless scenario.
IV. MESSAGE CONFIDENTIALITY USING SECRECY
ENCODERS
Next, we study two distinct approaches to keep the mes-
sages confidential from third parties: i) the wiretap channel
model, which exploits an advantage in terms of channel
quality at the legitimate receiver in this Section, and, ii)
secret key generation from shared randomness which exploits
a common alea shared by the legitimate pair and at least
partially unobserved by the opponent to generate a secret key
(e.g., to be used with some appropriate encryption scheme)
[34], in the next Section.
Wyner in [35] introduced the discrete memoryless wiretap
channel model. In this model the transmitter communicates
with a legitimate receiver and they want to keep the mes-
sage confidential from a third party who is eavesdropping
(passively intercepting the channel as in Fig. 5). In this
scheme, no secret key is shared between the legitimate nodes.
Wyner showed that the maximum achievable rate at which
both reliable communication between the legitimate parties
and weak secrecy with respect to the eavesdropper can be
established, referred to as the channel’s secrecy capacity Cs,
can be expressed as follows:
Cs = max
V→X→Y Z
I(U ;Y )− I(U ;Z), (13)
where Y is the observation of the legitimate receiver, Z de-
notes the observation of the eavesdropper,X is the transmitted
codeword and U is an auxiliary random variable such that
(U,X, Y Z) is a Markov chain U → X → Y Z . According
to (13), the secrecy capacity is the difference maximization
between two values of mutual information which is taken over
all possible input distributions p(x). Hence both the legitimate
receiver and the opponent channel conditions are essential to
wiretap code designs. As it is mentioned before, in this model,
the legitimate nodes do not need to share any secret key for
their communication. One of the main drawbacks of using
wiretap channel encoders in practice is that in this model the
secrecy of the communication can only be established when
there exists a particular input distribution p(x) such that the
mutual information of the main channel is higher than that of
the wiretap channel, which is not guaranteed. Importantly, the
transmitter needs to know the channel state of the opponent,
an assumption that is impractical in many scenarios.
As a solution to the latter concern, the wiretap channel
model with partial channel state information have been studied
[36], [37], using an appropriate model where the uncertainty
of practical CSI is taken into account. In the related model,
the wiretap channel coefficient is divided to two parts. The
first part is assumed to be known by the transmitter while
the second one is unknown. As the weight of the second
part becomes higher, the transmitter has lower information
of the wiretap channel coefficient. In the case that the wiretap
channel state is not available, the secrecy outage probability
of is alternatively used as the security performance metric, in
lieu of the secrecy capacity. The secrecy outage probability in-
dicates the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity
C′s is lower than a target value Cs.
Furthermore, a plethora of alternative techniques have also
been proposed in the literature to mitigate the need for
full adversarial CSI, such as transmitting in the adversary’s
null signal space by leveraging the potential of multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) transmission, injecting artifi-
cial noise to the adversarial signal space [38], [39], adaptive
power allocation [40]–[42], exploitation of relay channels,
faster than Nyquist assisted secrecy [43], [44], network coding
[45], [46], and cognitive radio systems [47], [48].
V. SECRET KEY GENERATION (SKG) FROM WIRELESS
FADING COEFFICIENTS
In this Section, we review the generation of secret keys
from common randomness in the form of the wireless channel
coefficient observed by a transmitter / receiver pair. This
approach exploits the reciprocity of the wireless channel
during the channel coherence time. The reciprocity refers to
the property that the channel responses at both sides are the
same (Fig 6). Therefore, the two endpoints of the channel
observe a noisy form of a shared randomness from which
they can distil a secret key. In a multipath rich environment,
a third party should be only a few wavelengths away from
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Figure 6: The channel based secret key generation system
model.
the transmitter or the receiver so that their observed channel
coefficients are independent from that in the direct channel
between the transmitter and the receiver; this is a practical
assumption in many actual wireless scenarios. Such generated
keys can be secure with information-theoretic guarantees
when the generation scheme is carefully applied, as opposed
to keys generated from pseudorandom number generators.
The SKG standard procedure typically encompasses three
phases [49]:
Advantage distillation: the legitimate nodes exchange
probe signals to obtain estimates of their reciprocal channel
state information (CSI) and pass them through a suitable
quantizer [50]. Commonly, the received signal strength (RSS)
has been used as the CSI parameter for generating the shared
key [51], while in [52], [53] the CSI phase has been proposed.
Information reconciliation: discrepancies in the quan-
tizer local outputs due to imperfect channel estimation are
reconciled through public discussion using Slepian Wolf de-
coders. In this phase, with the aid of public discussion, the
nodes should reconcile to a common key while avoiding
to reveal any information about it. Numerous practical in-
formation reconciliation approaches using standard forward
error correction (FEC) codes such as low density parity
check codes (LDPC) have been proposed [54], [55], while
in [52] the possibility of employing short Bose, Chaudhuri,
Hocquenghem (BCH) FEC codes has also been explored.
Privacy amplification: applying universal hash functions
to the reconciled information ensures that the generated keys
are uniformly distributed (i.e., have maximum entropy) and
are completely unpredictable by an adversary [56]. More
importantly, it ensures that even if an adversary has access
to (even a large) part of the decoder output, the final secret
key can be unpredictable [57]. However, in this case, the
genuinely random input space to the hash function needs to
be large enough in order to avoid brute force attacks. When
part of the reconciled information is known to the adversary,
the corresponding amount of entropy needs to be “supressed”
by the privacy amplifier.
Employing the standard SKG system model, let us assume
that the transmitter and the receiver exchange a probe signalX
in two consecutive slots and that their respective observations
ZA and ZB , can be expressed as
ZA = XH +NA, (14)
ZB = XH +NB, (15)
where X denotes the channel input and H is the channel
gain between the legitimate nodes, modeled as a circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random variable with zero mean
and variance σ2H . NA and NB denote accordingly circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian zero mean random variables
that model the impact of additive white Gaussian noise with
variances σ2A and σ
2
B , respectively (typically σ
2
A = σ
2
B).
A. Secret key rate
At first, let us assume that the attacker is a passive
eavesdropper that only tries to obtain an estimate of H by
interception. The case of an active attacker will be considered
next. The information theoretic limits regarding the rate for
generating secret keys has been established in [58]. From an
information theoretic perspective, a secret key with rate R is
achievable if for any ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large blocklength
n, there exists a public discussion strategy such that
Pr(KA 6= KB) < ǫ, (16)
1
n
I(Φ,Ψ;K1) < ǫ, (17)
1
n
H(K1) > R− ǫ, (18)
1
n
log(|K|) < 1
n
H(K) + ǫ, (19)
where Φ and Ψ denote the public messages sent by the
transmitter and receiver in the information reconciliation sub-
process, respectively, and KA and KB denote the distilled
keys by the transmitter and receiver, respectively.
Theorem 1: The secret key capacity Cs assuming unlimited
public discussion case is given as [49]
Cs = I(ZA;ZB). (20)
However, in some scenario, there may be some limitations
on public channel discussion. The capacity of secret key in
public channel with limited rate is discussed in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2: The secret key capacity Cs when the public
channel rate constraint is R, is given by [59]
Cs =max
U
I(U ;ZB), (21)
s.t. U → ZA → ZB, (22)
I(U ;ZA)− I(U ;ZB) ≤ R, (23)
where U is an auxiliary random variable.
Furthermore, it is possible that the evesdropper observes
a sequence ZE correlated to the the common randomness
source. In this case, the security constraint in (16) should
be transformed to
1
n
I(Φ,Ψ, ZE;K1) < ǫ. (24)
The secret key capacity Cs when the opponent has side
information ZE and the public channel rate constraint is R,
is in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: The secret key rate Rs is achievable when the
opponent has side information ZE and the public channel rate
constraint is R, is [59]
Rs =[I(U ;ZB)− I(U ;ZE)]+, (25)
s.t. U → ZA → ZB, (26)
I(U ;ZA)− I(U ;ZB) ≤ R, (27)
where U is an auxiliary random variable and [x]+ =
max{x, 0}.
B. Authenticated encryption using SKG
Under the system model in Fig. 6 and normalizing to unity
the noise variances, i.e., σ2A = σ
2
B = 1) for simplicity, the
SKG rate can expressed as [60]–[62]:
Rk = log2
(
1 +
Pσ2
2 + 1
Pσ2
)
, (28)
while the corresponding minimum necessary reconciliation
rate has been shown to be h(HB|HA) [58], where h(·)
denotes differential entropy. To develop a hybrid cryptosystem
that can withstand active attacks [63], [64], the SKG can be
used in conjunction with standard block ciphers, e.g., AES
in Galois counter mode (GCM), to build hybrid authenticated
encryption schemes.
As a sketch of such a hybrid scheme, let us assume a
system with three parties: Alice who wishes to transmit a
secret message m to Bob with confidentiality and integrity,
and Eve (the opponent), that can act as a passive and active
attacker. The following algorithms are employed:
• The SKG scheme denoted by G : H → K × S,
accepting as inputs a vector of complex numbers (the
fading coefficients), and generating as output a binary
vectors of sizes n and n− k, respectively, n, k ∈ N, (in
the key and the syndrome spaces), i.e.,
G(H) = (K,SA) , (29)
where K ∈ K denotes the key obtained from H after
privacy amplification and SA ∈ S is Alice’s syndrome
(side information used for reconciliation).
• A symmetric encryption algorithm, e.g., AES GCM,
denoted by Es : K × M → C where C denotes the
ciphertext space with corresponding decryption Ds :
K × C →M, such that
Es(K,m) = c, (30)
Ds(K, c) = m, (31)
for K ∈ K, m ∈M, c ∈ C.
• A pair of message authentication code (MAC) algo-
rithms, e.g., in HMAC mode, denoted by Sign : K ×
M → T , with a corresponding verification algorithm
Ver : K ×M× T → (yes, no), such that
Sign(K,m) = t, (32)
Ver(K,m, t) =
{
yes , if integrity verified
no, if integrity failed
(33)
A hybrid crypto-PLS system for AE SKG can be built as
follows:
1) The SKG procedure is launched between Alice and Bob
generating a key and a syndrome G(H)=(K,SA).
2) Alice breaks her key into two parts K = {Ke,Ki}
and uses the first to encrypt the message as c =
Es(Ke,m). Subsequently, using the second part of the
key she signs the ciphertext using the signing algorithm
t = Sign(Ki, c) and transmits to Bob the extended
ciphertext [SA‖c‖t], where [·‖·] denotes concatenation of
the corresponding binary vectors.
3) Bob checks first the integrity of the received cipher-
text as follows: from SA and his own observation he
evaluates K = {Ke,Ki} and computes Ver(Ki, c, t).
The integrity test will fail if any part of the extended
ciphertext was modified, including the syndrome (that
is sent as plaintext); for example, if the syndrome was
modified during the transmission, then Bob would not
have evaluated the correct key and the integrity test
would have failed.
4) If the integrity test is successful then Bob decrypts
m=Ds(Ke, c).
C. Shielding SKG from active attacks during pilot exchange
The proposed authenticated encryption scheme using SKG
is however vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MiM) attacks
during the pilot exchange phase, a vulnerability that was until
recently unexplored. Here, we propose a simple scheme to
overcome this issue. We assume a man-in-the-middle (MiM)
attack in the form of an injection signal and then move to
denial of service attacks in the form of jamming [65]–[67].
MiM attacks: MiM in SKG pilot exchange takes the form
of a signal injection. Various possible approaches have so far
surfaced on how to launch injection attacks; the attack can
consist in controlling the movement of intermediate objects
in the wireless medium, thus generating predictable changes
in the received RSSI (e.g., by obstructing or not the line of
sight), or the opponent can spoof the SKG process by injecting
a signal W to Alice and Bob so the opponent will have some
information about the secret key, as follows
ZA = XH +W +NA,
ZB = XH +W +NB, (34)
where W denotes the injected signal. A simple approach to
generate W can be devised as long as the adversary has one
more antenna than the legitimate users. An example, let us
consider the case in which Alice and Bob have one antenna
each and the MiM has two. In this case, the MiM can choose
a precoding matrix P so that
W = HAE
T
PXJ = HBE
T
PXJ (35)
where, HAE and HBE denote the channel matrices between
Alice and Eve and Bob and Eve, respectively. The precoding
matrix P can be built as follows:
HAE
T
PXJ = HBE
T
PXJ ⇒ P1 = HBE2 −HAE2
HAE1 −HBE1P2,
(36)
whereXJ is a generic transmitted signal by the MiM to satisfy
the power constraint.
Under this attack, the secret key rate controlled by the
opponent is upper bounded by [65]
L ≤ I(ZA, ZB;W ). (37)
A countermeasure to injection attacks can be built by random-
izing the pilot sequence exchanged between Alice and Bob
[65]. Here, we propose to randomize the pilots by drawing
them from a (scaled) QPSK modulation, as follows: instead
of transmitting the same probing signal X , Alice and Bob
transmit independent, random QPSK probe signals X and Y ,
respectively. Alice’s observation ZA is modified accordingly
as
ZA = Y H +W +NA, (38)
while Bob’s observation is given in (34). To establish shared
randomness in spite of the pilot randomization, Alice and
Bob post-multiply ZA and ZB by their randomized pilots,
obtaining local observations Z˜A and Z˜B (unobservable by
Mallory), expressed as:
Z˜A = XZA = XYH +XW +XNA, (39)
Z˜B = Y ZB = XYH + YW + Y NB. (40)
The source of shared randomness, when the pilots are ran-
domized QPSK symbols, is a circularly symmetric zero mean
Gaussian random variable, XYH ∼ CN (0, P 2σ2).
Furthermore, due to the fact that X and Y are independent
and have zero mean, the variables XW and YW are un-
correlated, circularly symmetric zero-mean Gaussian random
variables, and, therefore independent, while the same holds
for XNA, Y NB , i.e., (XW,YW ) ∼ CN (0, σ2JPΓI2) and
(XNA, Y NB) ∼ CN (0, P I2). Alice and Bob extract the
common key from the modified source of common random-
ness XYH as opposed to XH . On the other hand, since
XW,YW,XNA, Y NB are i.i.d. complex circularly symmet-
ric Gaussian random variables, the proposed scheme reduces
injection attacks to uncorrelated jamming attacks, i.e., we get
that
L ≤ I
(
Z˜A, Z˜B;W
)
= 0. (41)
Pilot randomization has in essence reduced injection attacks
to jamming attacks.
Jammming attacks: Building on the results of the pre-
vious subsection, we next examine in detail the scenario in
which the attacker acts as a jammer. Tow major alternatives
have been identified to counter jamming:
1) The legitimate nodes harvest energy (EH) from the
jamming signal: By harvesting the jamming power in a first
phase and exploiting it to boost the pilot power during SKG
in a second phase, the jammers action may in fact increase the
SKG capacity; in this case, the jammer should not launch the
attack, i.e., it is neutralized. However, it is not always optimal
for the legitimate nodes to neutralize the jammer. Indeed,
using EH can reduce the SKG capacity since, for a non-
trivial fraction of time, there is no secret bits generation; when
the jammer is neutralized the penalty in terms of SKG rate
might become too high, depending on the system parameters
[reference missing].
2) Channel hopping or spreading: If the legitimate nodes
do not have EH capabilities, yet there is another way to
defend against jamming by assuming that the legitimate
nodes can employ channel hopping or spreading over multiple
orthogonal subcarriers [paper reference missing].
Here, the idea is to use channel hopping in a random fashion
and avoid most of the jammers interference as opposed to
completely neutralizing it. Since potential jammers cannot
predict the subcarrier used by the legitimate nodes, they will
always spread their powers over the entire spectrum: the
larger the number of subcarriers, the smaller the jammers
interference on each subcarrier. However, channel hopping is
not always optimal since only a fraction of the entire spectrum
is used for SKG. Depending on the system parameters, it can
be preferable for the legitimate nodes to spread the available
power across the entire spectrum rather than concentrate it on
a single subcarrier.
VI. CONCLUSION
Many standard cryptographic schemes, particularly those in
the realm of public key encryption (PKE), are computationally
intensive, incurring considerable overhead. For example, a
3GPP report on the security of ultra reliable low latency
communication (URLLC) systems notes that “for a URLLC
service with higher speed than 65 kbps, the 3GPP Release
15 radio access network (RAN) cannot fulfill the quality
of service (QoS) requirement while enforcing user plane
integrity protection” [68]. Additionally, traditional public key
generation schemes are not quantum secure – in that when
sufficiently capable quantum computers will be available they
will be able to break current known public key encryption
schemes – unless the key sizes increase to impractical lengths.
In this chapter, we have reviewed alternative approaches
to secure future communication systems by considering PLS.
We have presented recent results on PLS with respect to
major emerging application areas in authentication, integrity
and confidentiality. We have focused on three topics of
secure communications, namely node authentication, message
integrity, and, secrecy, including secret key generation. We
have reviewed some of the information theoretic limits and
discussed implementations proposed recently in the literature.
Additionally, we have discussed open issues that need to be
addressed before the employment of PLS in future generation
networks.
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